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LIEN SURVIVAL IN CHAPTER 13: THE
AFTERMATH OF DEWSNUP*
I. INTRODUCTION
When the country is in a depressed housing slump and mortgage
foreclosures are on the rise, debtors could benefit by (1) stopping foreclo-
sures and keeping their homes, (2) cutting years of payments off their
mortgages, and (3) dragging out payback of arrearages over three to five
years without interest. Distressed homeowners, with the help of the
Bankruptcy Code (Code),' may have found a way to accomplish these
tasks by filing a petition under Chapter 13.2 However, in light of a recent
United States Supreme Court decision in Dewsnup v. Timm 3 and varying
arguments among bankruptcy courts, "lien stripping" in Chapter 13 may
not be allowed.
This comment addresses the possibility of stripping down a secured
creditor's lien on a home mortgage in Chapter 13, utilizing section
1322(b)(2).4 "Lien stripping" is a popular nickname for the process of
separating an undersecured claim into a secured claim equal to the value
of the collateral and an unsecured claim equal to the remainder of the
debt or unsecured deficiency pursuant to section 506(a).1 By the provi-
sions set forth in section 506(a), the lien is stripped from the mortgaged
property to the extent of any deficiency and relegated to the status of a
general unsecured claim. The portion of the claim that remains secured
is paid in full, with interest, while the deficiency may be paid in less than
its full amount and the unpaid balance discharged.
6
* This paper addresses how lien stripping would be treated in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992). However,
during the editorial production process, the Supreme Court decided that lien stripping would not be
allowed in a Chapter 13 case. Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 124 L. Ed.2d 228 (1993).
1. Title II United States Code, known as the Federal Bankruptcy Code, shall hereinafter be
referred to as the "Code," and all statutory provisions cited in the text are located within U.S.C. title
I I unless otherwise specified.
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1979) (providing for the reorganization of individual debtors).
3. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1979); see also Margaret Howard, Stripping Down Liens: Section
506(d) and the Theory of Bankruptcy, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 373 (1991); Alexander L. Cataldo et al.,
Residential Mortgage Bifurcation Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 96 COM L.J. 225
(1991).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1979).
6. Id. § 542(a)(2).
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This comment also discusses: the interplay of section 506(a) and
506(d) with section 1322(b)(2); the impact in Chapter 13 of the United
States Supreme Court's opinion in Dewsnup, a Chapter 7 case involving
lien stripping; and possible redfiags, problems, and practical applications
involved when a debtor lien-strips in Chapter 13.
II. THE BASICS OF LIEN STRIPPING
A. Basic Principles
Lien stripping is comprised of at least three basic elements: (1) a
debt;7 (2) a lien,8 mortgage, or other security interest 9 that designates
some item of property as collateral for that debt; and (3) the amount of
the debt exceeds the value of the collateral.
In the past, "lien stripping" has involved two steps: (1) bifurcation,
a process of separating an undersecured claim into a secured claim equal
to the value of the collateral and an unsecured claim equal to the remain-
der of the debt or unsecured deficiency pursuant to 506(a);10 and (2)
avoidance of the lien pursuant to section 506(d). 11 However, in light of
Dewsnup,12 step two, lien avoidance, is no longer allowed. Still, Dewsnup
did not overrule lien stripping per se.
Filing a petition in bankruptcy creates a bankruptcy estate.' 3 The
estate consists of assets which formerly belonged to the debtor but are
now held in trust.14 At the same time, creditors' interest in property of
the estate become "claims" against the estate. 5 If the debtor filed a peti-
tion under Chapter 7, then the property of the estate is liquidated, and
the proceeds are distributed to the creditors in proportion to the size of
their respective original interests. In contrast, if the debtor filed under
Chapters 9, 11, 12, or 13, the debtor's property is managed, and their
debts are restructured affording the debtor some relief which provide
7. "Debt" is defined as a liability on a claim. Id. § 101(12). A "claim" is defined as a right to
payment whether or not is as been (1) reduced to a judgment, (2) liquidated, (3) fixed, (4) matured,
(5) disputed, or (6) secured. Id. § 101(5) It can also be a right to an equitable remedy for breach of a
contract or some other breach of performance. Id.
8. A "lien" is a charge against or interest in property which secures payment of a debt or
performance of an obligation. Id. § 101(37).
9. A "security interest" is a lien created by an agreement. Id. § 101(51).
10. Id. § 506(a) (1979).
11. Id. § 506(d).
12. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
13. Id. § 541(a).
14. Id.
15. Id. §§ 101(5), (12), and 502.
[V/ol. 28:843
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creditors a prorated stream of reimbursement under a restructured pay-
ment plan.16 However, in practice there are major exceptions to prorated
reimbursement. In particular, if a debtor's asset were subject to a lien
before bankruptcy, it continues to be subject to the lien after bankruptcy,
and the creditor holding the lien is entitled to full compensation free of
the claims of other unsecured creditors.
17
Generally, if the non-exempt collateral18 is worth more than the
debt (if the creditor is oversecured), then the excess value or equity in the
property may be taken and used by the bankruptcy estate for the benefit
of unsecured creditors. 19 But, if the collateral is worth less than the total
amount of the debt (if the creditor is undersecured), then the property's
entire value is committed to that secured creditor alone.20 Such a se-
cured creditor might insist on foreclosing its lien on the property by tak-
ing the property away from both the bankruptcy estate and the debtor.21
Even after the value of the property has been applied to the debt, some of
the debt may remain unpaid and a "deficiency" will remain. The par-
tially-unsatisfied creditor might then continue to claim an unsecured
claim for the deficiency against the bankruptcy estate or the debtor.
2 2 If
the trustee or debtor want to save the property from foreclosure, he or
she may make an arrangement with the secured creditor to postpone
foreclosure in return for installment payments on the debt.23 As pay-
ments continue to be made, the total amount of the debt shrinks, but the
collateral cannot be freed from the security interest until all of the debt
has been paid in full. Thus, a debtor may be forced to repay all of a debt
to save a sensitive item of collateral that is worth far less than the total
amount of the debt. From a debtor's point of view, he must buy back his
property from the secured creditor at a price that exceeds its fair market
value. To prevent this, a debtor's attorney commences to lien strip.
B. Steps to Commence Lien Stripping
In order to lien strip one must first invoke section 506(a) which pro-
vides as follows:
16. Id. § 726; see §§ 542, 543, 546, 548, and 554 for an understanding of what may or may not
constitute property of the estate for purposes of reimbursing creditors.
17. Id. § 725.
18. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 for a list of the various federal exemptions a debtor may claim in order
to keep certain personal and real property excluding it from property of the estate.
19. DAVID G. EPSTEIN, ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 676 (1993); 11 U.S.C. § 726.
20. 11 U.S.C. §§ 724, 725.
21. Id. § 725.
22. Id. § 506.
23. Id. § 722.
19931
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An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which
the estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553
of this title, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such credi-
tor's interest in the estate's interest in such property, or to the extent of
the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured
claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or the
amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed
claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the
valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and
in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan
affecting such creditor's interest.24
After invoking section 506(a), the debtor's attorney will, by motion,
ask the bankruptcy court to officially determine the value of the collat-
eral.2" This value can be something less than the total amount of the
creditor's claim. According to section 506(a), once these amounts have
been determined, the total claim is bifurcated: (1) a secured claim equal
to the fair market value of the collateral and (2) an unsecured claim
equal to the remainder of the debt.
The debtor's next step in the process of lien stripping is to invoke
section 506(d). This subsection states that:
To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not
an allowed secured claim, such lien is void, unless- (1) such claim
was disallowed only under section 502(e) of this title; or (2) such claim
is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure of any entity to
file a proof of such claim under section 501 of this title.26
When invoking section 506(d), the debtor requests the court to void the
portion of a creditor's lien that is deemed unsecured pursuant to section
506(a).
The bankruptcy court, following these provisions, will then cut the
secured creditor's debt into two parts. One part of the claim will be
equal to the present value of the collateral, as previously determined by
the bankruptcy court and continues to attach to the collateral. The other
part of the debt, equal in amount to the deficiency, no longer attaches to
the collateral. The deficiency will then be relegated to unsecured status.
In the final step of this process, the debtor receives a discharge of all
scheduled debts that are dischargeable. The bankruptcy discharge is an
24. Id. § 506(a) (emphasis added).
25. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012 (providing that a court may determine the value of a secured
claim "on motion of any party in interest"); see In re Doss, 143 B.R. 952, 954 (Bankr. E.D. Okla.
1992) (holding that a request for valuation under section 506 must be made pursuant to motion
under Bankruptcy Rule 3012).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d).
[Vol. 28:843
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injunction that allows a creditor to collect any unpaid debts in rem,27 but
it forbids any further collection activities in personam.28 After the
debtor's discharge, the creditor may still foreclose on the collateral since
foreclosure is an in rem action, and the debtor will be forced to pay the
creditor in full to retain possession of the collateral. However, after lien
stripping, the debtor will have to pay only the judicially determined value
of the collateral and not the full amount of the debt. The unsecured
deficiency is separated from the collateral by section 506(a) and (d) and is
discharged by section 524.
In summary, after lien stripping, the collateral secures only that part
of the debt equal to the collateral's fair market value at the time of bank-
ruptcy; the rest of the debt becomes entirely unsecured. The debtor can
buy back his property from the secured creditor for what the property
was worth when the debtor went bankrupt, regardless of the size of the
debt which the property secured.
This could result in a tremendous benefit to debtors while detrimen-
tally affecting creditors. The debtor, who originally borrowed the full
amount of the debt and not just the present value of the collateral, can
keep the collateral and a substantial part of the money he originally bor-
rowed. This certainly improves a debtor's financial obligation, but it
also grants a debtor a sizeable windfall at the expense of a secured credi-
tor, which can be unfair and dangerous to the citizenry at large because it
threatens to discourage credit access. The creditors are, in theory, as-
suming the risk of the property depreciating in value faster than the debt.
But is this utilization of section 506 consistent with legislative intent?
The United States Supreme Court was asked this question in Dewsnup v.
Timm.2
9
III. THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS OUT: DEwsNUP V. TiMM
A. Facts
In Dewsnup v. Timm, the Supreme Court ruled that the Code did
not allow a Chapter 7 debtor to strip down an undersecured creditor's
lien on real property.3" The debtor had borrowed $119,000.00, which
was secured by a deed of trust on two sections of farmland. During the
27. Actions taken against a "thing" instead of against a "person." This action determines the
right in specific property against all of the world and is equally binding on everyone. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 404 (5th ed. 1979).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 524. An action against the person involving his personal rights and not against
a specific piece of property. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 404 (5th ed. 1979).
29. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
30. Id. See generally Bankr. Serv. L. Ed. § 6A:28; Bankr. Desk Guide § 23:28.
1993]
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next year the debtor defaulted on the note.3 Three bankruptcies and
nearly fourteen years later, the creditor had not been paid or allowed to
foreclose on the property. The creditor moved for abandonment of the
property. The Bankruptcy Court, after a hearing, valued the property at
$39,000.00, barely one-third of the total debt which the property was
supposed to secure. Because there was no equity in the property over
and above the amount of the debt, the property was of no value to the
estate, and the trustee abandoned it.3
2
The debtors then fied an adversary proceeding, 3  seeking first to
value the property down to its fair market value of $39,000.00 and to
then use section 506(a)34 to divide the claim into a $39,000.00 secured
claim and an $80,000.00 unsecured claim. Next, the debtors attempted
to use section 506(d) 35 to void the undersecured portion, thus effectively
avoiding the lien on the undersecured portion of the claim and keeping
the property by paying merely $39,000.00 to the lienholder, who may
recover all or none of his remaining unsecured claim. The amount of the
lienholder's recovery will depend on the amount of money received from
the liquidation of the property of the estate.36 However, the Supreme
Court held that section 506(a) could not be invoked by the Chapter 7
debtor to split the claim and to avoid the undersecured portion of the
lien.37
31. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 775.
32. See 11 U.S.C. § 554 (concerning abandonment of property of the bankruptcy estate).
33. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001-7087 (comprising the requirements for filing of an adversary
proceeding).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). This section provides:
(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property which the estate has
an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured claim to
the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property, or
to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim
to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or the amount so subject to setoff is
less that the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the
purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in
conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such credi-
tor's interest.
Id.
35. Id. § 506(d). This section states:
(d) To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed
secured claim, such lien is void, unless (1) such claim was disallowed only under section
502(e) of this title; or (2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure
of any entity to file a proof of such claim under section 501 of this title.
Id.
36. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 776 (1992).
37. Id. at 778.
[Vol. 28:843
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The Supreme Court perceived the problem as one of properly inter-
preting the interplay between section 506(a) and (d). The Court focused
specifically on legislative intent in reaching their conclusion that the lien
should stay with the real property until the time of foreclosure, thus de-
termining that lien avoidance is prohibited.38
The debtors argued that section 506(a) and (d) are complementary
and should be read together to allow lien stripping. Under section 506(a)
the creditor "would have an allowed secured claim only to the extent of
the judicially determined value of the collateral."' 39 Then, under section
506(d), the bankruptcy court should void the lien on the remaining un-
secured claim, because it is not an "allowed secured claim" pursuant to
section 506(a)."'40
The creditor argued that section 506(a) and (d) were not to be
strictly applied.4 1 According to the creditor, section 506(a) merely func-
tions to insure that each unsecured claimant is treated fairly by classify-
ing claims by their status as either secured or unsecured at the time the
property of the estate is distributed.42 Consequently, 506(d) works to
void the lien only at the time of foreclosure, rather than at the time of the
section 506 hearing.
In the alternative, the United States, as amicus curiae, argued that
the words, "allowed secured claim" must be looked at in a much broader
sense.4 3 The government argued that the words should be separated and
read word by word to mean any claim that is first "allowed" and then
"secured."' An allowed claim is a claim against an estate that is a debt
or charge which is valid in law and should be enforced. 4 Pursuant to
section 502(a), a proof of claim that is filed under section 501 is deemed
to be allowed unless objected to by a party in interest.46 A secured claim
is supported or backed by security or collateral that gives assurance of
payment of a particular debt or discharge of an obligation. 7 Therefore,
38. Id. at 778-79.
39. Id. at 776-77.
40. Id. Section 506(a) divides claims which are allowed under section 502 into secured and
unsecured claims. Any portion of the allowed claim found to be unsecured under section 506(a) is
not an "allowed secured claim" within the lien avoiding scope of section 506(d). Id.
41. Id. at 777.
42. Id.
43. Id. ("[Section] 506(d) need not be read as an indivisible term of art defined by reference to
§ 506(a), which by its terms is not a definitional provision.").
44. Id.
45. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 40 (5th ed. 1979).
46. 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(a), 501.
47. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 703 (5th ed. 1979). One may give security in the form of either
1993]
7
Patterson: Lien Survival in Chapter 13: The Aftermath of Dewsnup
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1992
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
the lien should not be voided because the claim at issue was not within
the scope of section 506(d) since the claim had been fully "allowed" and
was "secured. ' 48 Section 506(d) has a much narrower application in that
a lien which secures a claim against the debtor may only be voided when
the claim is an unallowed secured claim, an allowed unsecured claim, or
an unallowed unsecured claim.
The Supreme Court49 chose to follow the argument of the United
States. The Dewsnup Court held that due to the ambiguity of the text, it
was not convinced that Congress wanted to establish laws contrary to
well established pre-Code rules, which provided that liens secured by real
property pass through bankruptcy unaffected. 0 There were insufficient
reasons to attribute to congress an intent to upset established bankruptcy
principles and grant debtors a broad new remedy against undersecured
claims. 5
1
However, the dissent in Dewsnup argued that whenever a claim that
secures a debt is not both an "allowed claim" and a "secured claim," the
lien will be automatically avoided under section 506(d). 2 They also dis-
agreed with the majority's conclusion that the language was ambiguous
and the meaning of "allowed secured claim" was left to speculation.5 3
The dissent believed that even when the phrase "allowed secured claim"
appears outside of section 506, it inevitably means that the secured claim
is the amount of a creditor's allowed claim that is secured after the re-
quired calculations for that particular provision have been performed. 4
a lien, mortgage, pledge or some other form of security to be used if the debtor fails to fulfill his
obligation. Id.
48. Id. The United States also pointed out that to allow the lien to be avoided would go against
the legislative intent to preserve such type of liens. This is evidenced by the fact that there is nothing
in the legislative history that reflects any intent to change the pre-Code bankruptcy law that pre-
served such liens. This would also impair the "fresh start" policy, which would not permit an in rem
claim against property. Id.
49. The Supreme Court reached their decision by a 6-2 vote. Id.
50. Id. at 778. The Court focused heavily on the law before establishment of the 1978 Act,
where liens and other secured interests survived bankruptcy. With the exception of the Code sec-
tions 616(1) and (10) (1976), no provision would permit the involuntary reduction of a creditor's lien
for any reason other than payment on the debt. Thus, to effect a major change in the pre-Code
practice, it has been reluctantly applied. Id.; see United Say. Assoc. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest Assoc. 484 U.S. 365, 380 (1988).
51. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 778.
52. Id. at 780. To hold differently would replace what Congress said with what the Court
thinks Congress should have said. This would "impair for future use, well-established principles of
statutory construction." Id.
53. Id. at 780.
54. Id. at 780; see, eg., I1 U.S.C. § 722 (permitting a Chapter 7 debtor to redeem certain
tangible personal property from liens securing dischargeable consumer debt by "paying the holder of
such lien the amount of the allowed secured claim of such holder that is secured by such lien"); id.
§ 1225(a)(5) (describing treatment of allowed secured claims in family farmers' reorganization
plans); id. § 1325(a)(5) (describing treatment of allowed secured claims in regards to an individual
[Vol. 28:843
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Consequently, there is a clear and convincing pattern of using the phrase
"allowed secured claim" to mean exactly what it says, as suggested in
506(a), and not to be broken up and read term by term.55
The Dewsnup majority further concluded that to allow the creditor's
secured interest to be frozen at the judicially determined value, rather
than at the value at time of foreclosure, could create a "windfall" for the
debtor.56 The Dewsnup Court reasoned that the lien must stay with the
property until foreclosure because that is what the parties bargained for
in executing the home mortgage.57 This would allow any increase in the
value of the property after it is judicially determined to accrue to the
benefit of the estate and not to the benefit of the debtor or to other un-
secured creditors whose claims had nothing to do with the mortgagor-
mortgagee agreement.58
In focusing on legislative intent and the word by word analysis of
506(d), the Supreme Court declared that, in a Chapter 7, if a claim is
disallowed under section 502(b), then the lien on the property that is
undersecured must be avoided pursuant to section 506(d). However, if a
secured claim is allowed, section 506(d) may not be used to avoid the
unsecured portion.59 Thus, section 506(d) does not allow the avoidance
of a lien on a claim that has been fully allowed pursuant to section 502.
However, a lien might still be avoided under some authority other than
reorganization) (emphasis added); see also Gaglia v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Assoc., 889 F.2d 1304
(3rd Cir. 1989); (holding that the language of section 506(a) and (d) is not ambiguous, and that there
is no need to look further into the legislative history or intent); In re Moses, No. 89-03267-C (N.D.
Okla. 1990) (memorandum opinion and order) (adopting the analysis used in Gaglia, stating that
these sections clearly mean that when a claim against property is not an allowed secured claim, the
lien securing that claim is voided).
The Code is also consistent with its use of the phrase "allowed unsecured claim" in describing
how a claim that is "unsecured" is treated under section 506(a). See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)
(concerning priority of "allowed unsecured claims of governmental units"); id. § 726(a)(2) (provid-
ing for payment of "allowed unsecured claim[s]" in Chapter 7 liquidations); id. § 1225(a)(4) (provid-
ing standards for treatment of "allowed unsecured claim[s]" in family farmer reorganization plans);
id. § 1325(a)(4) (providing standards for treatment of "allowed unsecured claim[s]" in individual
reorganizations).
55. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 780.
56. Id. The increase in the value of the property from the time of judicial determination to the
value at time of foreclosure would accrue not to the estate but to the debtor creating a "windfall."
Id. See infra pp. 864-65.
57. Id. at 778.
58. Id.
59. The Court focused on the legislative history of the word "allowed" rather than "secured."
They specified that section 506(d) could not be used to avoid the lien but did not refer to the term
"bifurcate," thus leaving a path open to find a way to use another code section to bifurcate an
allowed secured claim. Id.
9
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section 506(d), if such exists."
IV. GOING FORWARD: LIEN-STRIPPING AND ITS APPLICATION
IN CHAPTER 13
A. General Application in Chapter 13
1. Mechanics of Chapter 13
Chapter 13 provides debt relief for individuals with regular in-
come.61 Its primary purpose is to enable such an individual to develop
and implement a "plan"62 to repay his debts over a period of time.63
Section 1322 sets forth the requirements for a Chapter 13 plan."4 The
plan must be approved by the bankruptcy court and usually provides for
payments to the creditors over a three to five year period.6" This is ac-
complished by distributing all of the debtor's net disposable income to
creditors on a percentage basis.66 The debtor is given enough time dur-
ing the plan to repay a large portion of his debts. In return, the debtor is
shielded from creditors' piecemeal collection efforts, 67 and any unpaid
balance due after the term of the plan may be discharged. 6 To receive a
discharge of the portion of unsecured debts not repaid, the debtor must
complete the plan.69
2. Chapter 13 Lien Stripping-Secured and Unsecured Claims
The debtor's power to modify secured creditors' claims is provided
60. Id. The Dewsnup Court left open the issue as to whether lien avoidance could be accom-
plished through some other provision of the bankruptcy code or by application to a different set of
facts under a chapter other than Chapter 7.
61. 11 U.S.C. § 303(a). This provision is only available to individuals with regular income and
must be voluntary, and who, upon the date of filing the petition, must owe "non-contingent, liqui-
dated, unsecured debts of less than $100,000.00, and non-contingent, liquidated, secured debts of less
than $350,000.00." Id. § 109(e).
62. Id. § 1321 (providing for filing of the plan); id. § 1322 (providing for contents of the plan).
63. In re First Nat'l Fidelity Corp., 25 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 731, 735 (3rd Cir. 1991)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6079).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 1322.
65. Id. §§ 1322, 1324, and 1325.
66. Id. §§ 1322 and 1326.
67. Id. § 362.
68. Id. § 1328.
69. Id. § 1328(a); see id. § 1328(b) (listing exceptions for granting discharge under a "hard-
ship"). Most creditors are less aggrieved by debtors' resort to Chapter 13 than to Chapter 7, because
Chapter 13 constitutes an attempt to repay one's creditors. BAXER DUNAWAY, THE LAWS OF
DISTRESS REAL ESTATE, FORECLOSURE, WORKOUTS, PROCEDURES §§ 24A.01[I], [2][a] (1993).
See generally COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE, 201-57 (1987); MARTIN A. FREY ET AL.,
AN INTRODUCTION TO BANKRUPTCY LAW, 397-423 (2nd ed. 1992); GEORGE M. TREISTER ET.
AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW, 315-327 (1986) (providing background for petitions
under Chapter 13).
10
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for by section 1322(b)(2).7° Section 1322(b)(2) allows the debtor to
"modify" the rights of secured creditors and provides in part:
the plan may modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than
a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the
debtor's principal residence or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave
unaffected the rights of holders of any class of claims.7 1
Section 1322(b)(1) authorizes modification with respect to the rights
of unsecured creditors. Modification is defined as "a change; an altera-
tion or amendment which introduces new elements into the details, or
cancels some of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect of the
subject matter intact."' 72 Thus, a debtor may not change the payment,
interest rate, or terms of the original agreement. Also, because section
1322(c) allows a three to five year plan, the Chapter 13 debtor may not
modify the rights of a secured claim holder whose debt is payable over a
term longer than five years.73
In comparison to a Chapter 13 modification, the standard modifica-
tion of an unsecured claim is to write the claim down to an amount no
lower than an amount that would be paid if it was a Chapter 7 case and
then pay that value plus interest over the life of the plan. A modification
that satisfies this standard is deemed to be in the best interest of creditors,
and this standard is appropriately referred to as the best interest of credi-
tors test.74 The test, as it applies to secured creditors, is laid out in sec-
tion 1325(a)(5), which provides:
[the court shall confirm the plan if] with respect to each allowed se-
cured claim provided for by the plan (A) the holder of such claim has
accepted the plan; (B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such
claim retain the lien securing such claim; and (ii) the value, as of the
effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan
on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such
claim; or (C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to
70. Chapter 11 also provides for modification of secured creditor's claims. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.
§ 1123 (providing for modification of secured creditor's claims). Chapter 11 allows the Debtor in
Possession ("DIP") to divide a loan into two claims: one secured claim equal to the value of the
collateral and an unsecured claim for the deficiency. The DIP may then either sell the asset free of
the security or substitute one piece of collateral for another; change the term of the loan and the
amount of each installment; or decelerate a loan on which there has been a default and acceleration
of a debtor. EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 708.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (emphasis added).
72. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 905 (5th ed. 1979). This term is not defined in the Code.
73. See, e.g., In re Foster, 61 B.R. 492 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986). A debtor has no right to
modify a debt whose last payment is due after the end of its proposed plan. He may only cure and
reinstate the debt. Id.
74. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). See infra pp. 865-66.
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such holder." s
Basically, this test mandates that the secured creditor should get the
value of its collateral either through secured payments with a present
value equal to the collateral or by the debtor's surrender of the property
to the secured creditor.
Application of the test is best illustrated by a hypothetical involving
a secured loan on an automobile with final payment due during the plan
period. If the car's value is $10,000.00 and is secured by a $15,0000.00
loan, then section 506(a) allows the debtor to write the loan down to the
value of the car and treat the remaining $5,000.00 as an unsecured
debt.76 Payment of the unsecured portion is relegated with other un-
secured creditors who may receive only a residue of their original claim.
Thus, in inflationary times, this provision has great benefits for
Chapter 13 debtors. Because most debtors' liability will be payable in
less than five years, these debts will be allowed modifications under sec-
tion 1322(b)(2). The only exception to this rule is the debtor's home
mortgage.
B. Lien Stripping the Home Mortgage in Chapter 13
One of the most important reasons debtors file under Chapter 13 is
to avoid the loss of their home when foreclosure is being threatened.
Thus, the ability to modify a secured creditor's claim secured by a home
mortgage to the depressed fair market value appears attractive to the
debtor. The debtor could buy his house at the fair market value rather
than the original loan amount. The question therefore, is whether this
avenue is authorized by the Bankruptcy Code. To answer this question,
this section will examine (1) the legislative intent of section 1322(b)(2),
(2) how the Dewsnup Court's opinion applies to Chapter 13, and (3) the
ability of section 1322(b)(2) to strip liens on a home mortgage.
1. Background: Legislative Intent and Statutory Interpretation
Courts should only look to legislative intent of a statute when they
feel that the ambiguity of its language makes its intent unclear.77 Thus,
some courts have often looked to legislative intent in settling controver-
sies regarding lien splitting of a home mortgage. The following section
discusses (1) the legislative history of the statute's language and how it
75. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).
76. EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 709.
77. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982).
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has been changed, and (2) how various courts have interpreted the lan-
guage in section 1322(b)(2) in connection with legislative intent.78
This search into the legislative intent reveals that the original draft
of the Code recommended that secured indebtedness on personal prop-
erty be subject to modification.79 The House version allowed this modifi-
cation to extend to both real and personal property. 0 The Senate then
wanted to restrict the House version by adding the phrase "modify the
rights of holders of secured claims (other than claims wholly secured by
mortgages on real property) or of holders of unsecured claims."8 " Conse-
quently, the final version reflected the compromise of both committees.8 2
The word "wholly" was changed to the word "only."
No one could explain the reason behind the change 3 until In re
Grubbs, where the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that Congress
wanted to protect the home mortgage industry:
With regard to § 1322(b)(2), the Senate receded from its position that
no "modification" was to be permitted of any mortgage secured by real
estate; it instead agreed to a provision that modification was to be
barred only as to a claim "secured only by a security interest in real
property that is the debtor's principal residence." This limited bar was
apparently in response to perceptions, or to suggestions advanced in
the legislative hearing [by advocates for secured creditors], that home-
mortgagor lenders, performing a valuable social service through their
loans, needed special protection against modification thereof (i.e., re-
ducing installment payments, secured valuations, etc.).84
For similar reasons, the bankruptcy court in In re Strober held that
the legislative history of this section clearly settles controversies by
prohibiting modification of residential mortgages in Chapter 13.85 How-
ever, the Tenth Circuit Court in In re Hart followed a different route in
78. See, eg., In re Strober, 136 B.R. 614, 620 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1992).
79. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.S.C.A.N. 5787.
80. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
81. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); see Grubbs v. Houston First American Say. Assoc.,
730 F.2d 236, 245 n.14 (5th Cir. 1984).
82. See In re Woodall, 123 B.R. 95, 96 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1990) ("The House version was
more favorable to debtors and the Senate version was more favorable to lenders."), rev'd, 931 F.2d
64 (10th Cir. 1991). Thus, Congress literally "split the baby" by allowing bifurcation of claims into
secured and unsecured claims. Id.; see also Hon. Alexander Paskay, Determination of Secured Status
& Section 506 Lien Stripping, Is There Life for Lien-Stripping After Dewsnup?, AM. BANKR. INST.
NEWSLETrER, May 1992, at 26.
83. Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 245 n.14.
84. Id. at 246 (emphasis added); see also In re Glenn, 760 F.2d 1428, 1433-34 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, Miller v. First Federal of Michigan, 474 U.S. 849 (1985); In re Harris, 94 B.R. 832, 836
(D. N.J. 1989); In re Foster, 61 B.R. 492, 495 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986).
85. In re Strober, 136 B.R. 614, 620 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y 1992) (interpreting the legislative his-
tory which indicates the statute was drafted to avoid any detrimental effects on the home mortgage
industry; thus, disallowing the bifurcation of the Strober's home mortgage); see First Nat'l Fidelity
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determining Congress' intent. 6
The court began with the assumption that whenever Congress en-
acts laws, the "ordinary meaning" of the language clearly states its pur-
pose."7 The plain intended meaning should be very straight forward
unless a "rare case" occurs where the literal application of a statute will
foster conclusions that are on the far side of the spectrum from what the
drafters originally intended."8 The Tenth Circuit concluded that looking
to the plain meaning of the statute to determine the section's true mean-
ing was less speculative than trying to weed through the legislative his-
tory. By applying the plain meaning of the statute the court was not
producing a drastically different intent than the one initially intended by
its drafters.89 The Hart court determined that nothing in the plain lan-
guage of section 1322(b)(2) requires going beyond the Code's statutory
definition of the term "secured claims" to search for protection for the
unsecured amount of an undersecured home mortgage. Thus, the court
concluded that modification of the undersecured home mortgage claim
was allowed.90
C. Dewsnups Application In Chapter 13
In determining whether Dewsnup's construction of universal section
506 applies to undersecured home mortgage creditors in Chapter 13, the
first statute that should be addressed is section 103(a). Section 103, a
universal chapter, provides: "Except as provided in section 1161 of this
title, chapter 1, 3, and 5 of this title apply in a case under chapter 7, 11,
Corp. v. Perry, 25 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 731, 736 (3rd Cir. 1991) (stating that the prohibition
against modification of home mortgage lender's rights was designed to protect homeowners by giving
them access to mortgage money on affordable terms).
86. 21 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 385, 388 (10th Cir. 1991).
87. Id.; see Justice v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 849 F.2d 1078, 1084 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting Park'N
Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)).
88. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982); see Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S.
Ct. 773, 786 (1992) (stating that the court should simply enforce the new Code by interpreting its
terms by their plain meaning without insisting upon at least some discussion of the legislative intent
and the change from its prior law).
89. In re Hart, 21 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 385, 388 (1991).
90. See Moore v. Wade, No. 92-0019 at 6 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. March 25, 1992) (order denying
motion to dismiss). The Court concluded that:
various other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code become difficult to explain-for example
§ 1111(b) would seem to become superfluous, for every secured creditor would have an
automatic '1111(b) election.' If allowed secured claims are not allowed to be broken into
two separate claims, one secured and the other unsecured, and treated separately, leaving
the unsecured parts not necessarily paid in full, then the majority of plans filed under
Chapters 11, 12, and 13 would be unworkable. The reorganization or rehabilitation of
nearly all debtors would become an impossible task.
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12, or 13 of this title." 91 In light of section 103, it is reasonable to con-
clude that the court's interpretation of section 506(d) would also apply in
other chapters. However, Dewsnup merely prohibited lien avoidance on
an allowed secured claim under Chapter 7, but failed to address whether
a undersecured lien on a home mortgage could be stripped in a Chapter
13.
Some bankruptcy courts have resolved the issue by inferring that
section 1322(b)(2) takes priority over section 506(a).92 In In re David-
off,93 a Florida bankruptcy court held that although section 506 is appli-
cable in Chapter 13 cases, it is limited by the specific language of section
1322(b)(2).94 Because the bank had a secured claim which was allowed,
the lien could not be avoided because to do so would modify the rights of
the security interest holders, which is strictly prohibited by section
1322(b)(2). Other federal bankruptcy courts have interpreted Dewsnup
as not being applicable in Chapter 13 cases. 95 One Judge in the Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma ruled that Dewsnup
did not overrule controlling circuit court precedents that allowed lien
stripping because it did not specifically address the issue under a case in
Chapter 13.96
However, the Tenth Circuit Court in In re Hart disagreed with the
Davidoff court, believing it to be an incorrect reading of the Code.97 The
Tenth Circuit decided that when a mortgage is undersecured, section
506's purpose is to value the secured claim and bifurcate the claim into
secured and unsecured. Thus, the secured claim remains protected under
section 1322(b)(2), and only the unsecured claim is modified or stripped
of the lien. 98
The Dewsnup Court led the reader to a dead end as to whether the
decision would apply in other bankruptcy chapters. The Dewsnup Court
91. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a).
92. Hart, 21 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) at 387.
93. 136 B.R. 567, 569 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
94. Id. (holding due to the limitations of section 1322(b)(2), the bank's claim was an allowed
secured claim in which the lien could not be stripped).
95. In re Ward, No. 91-01868 at 4 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. July 12, 1991) (order on motion to
reconsider).
96. Id. (stating that the Supreme Court would have at least cited, discussed, or acknowledged
the existence of precedents which would overrule the circuits' rulings).
97. Id. at 388.
98. In re Hart, 21 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 385, 388 (1991) (holding that Congress had left no
unanswered questions regarding the treatment of under secured claims). Congress provided that an
undersecured claim be divided into two parts and that in Chapter 13 the secured portion has special
protection when residential real estate lending is involved. However the unsecured portion is not
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limited its focus to the case before them and allowed "other facts to await
their legal resolution on another day."99 Therefore, it would seem that
with Dewsnup and the contradicting opinions among the various circuits
and no further supreme court determination yet on this issue,t°° both
debtors and creditors are left only with their circuit as to whether lien
stripping of a home mortgage lien is allowed in Chapter 13.101 In contin-
uing to find the correct answer, the next step is an in depth analysis of
section 1322(b)(2) and its affect on liens secured by home mortgages.
3. Stripping Home Mortgage Liens Under Section 1322(b)(2)
The courts have developed three approaches to the bifurcation of a
creditor's lien that is secured only by a lien on a debtor's principal resi-
dence in Chapter 13.102 One approach permits the debtor to divide the
creditor's claim into a secured and unsecured claim, but prohibits modi-
fying the unsecured claim if the debtor does not propose to pay off the
entire secured claim in the plan. A second approach which relies on
Dewsnup, strictly prohibits claim modification. The creditor's secured
99. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 778; see 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 506.07 (15th ed. 1986)
(applying section 506 to the other chapters in Bankruptcy).
100. See Nobleman v. American Say. Bank, 23 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 584 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992).
101. Courts in the Fourth, Six, and Seventh Circuits allow protection of only the secured portion
of a home mortgage under section 1322(b)(2) by applying section 506(a), then giving the protection
of section 1322(b)(2) only to the secured portion; see McNair v. Chrysler First Fin. Servs. Corp., 115
B.R. 520, 523 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990); In re Demoff, 109 B.R. 902, 915 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989); In
re Hill, 96 B.R. 809, 813-14 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); In re Frost, 96 B.R. 804, 807 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1989).
Courts in the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that bifurcation is inappropriate.
These courts have relied on four different rationales as follows:
(1) the legislative history mandated protection of the home mortgage lender, and bifurca-
tion impermissible dilutes that protection; (2) as a matter of statutory construction, the
requirements of a specific section, in this case section 1322(b)(2), control those of a general
section, in this case section 506(a); (3) as a matter of statutory construction, the courts
should look to the definition of "claim" from section 101(4), which includes both secured
and unsecured claims, rather than the definition of "secured claim" from section 506(a);
and (4) analysis of the legislative history should look back to Chapter XIII of the now-
repealed Bankruptcy Act, predecessor to the Code, for guidance in the definition of secured
claims.
Hart, 2, Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) at 387-88; see also In re Chaves, 117 B.R. 733, 736-37 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1990); In re Sauber, 115 B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990); In re Schum, 112 B.R. 159, 162
n.3 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990); In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 B.R. 200, 202-03 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989); In re
Catlin, 81 B.R. 522, 524 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
Even in the Tenth Circuit's jurisdiction, courts are split as to whether to apply bifurcation. See
In re Hart, 21 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) at 389; In re Brouse, 110 B.R. 539, 543-44 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1990); In re Ross, 107 B.R. 759, 762 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989); In re Simmons, 78 B.R. 300, 303
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1987).
102. Third Circuit Allows Strip Down of Lien on Unadministered Property, Bankruptcy Service
Current Awareness Alert 2, 6 (December 1989).
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claim is the original amount of the claim and not the amount of the se-
cured claim after the section 506(a) split. A third approach permits split-
ting the claim into two parts pursuant to section 506(a), an unsecured
part and a secured part and avoidance of the lien as to the unsecured
portion of the indebtedness. 10 3 These varying approaches have left both
debtors and creditors in a shadow of confusion.
As discussed earlier, a secured creditor's claim, other than one se-
cured by a home mortgage, may by modified pursuant to section
1322(b)(2). This special protection offered by section 1322(b)(2) does not
permit a debtor to modify monthly payments, change the rate of interest,
or make any other changes in the agreement with respect to a creditor
whose claim is secured only by a security interest in real property that is
the debtor's principal residence. 104
Thus, if a debtor is continuing to make the same mortgage payments
at the same interest rate and is curing the default by payments through
the plan, the creditor's secured claim is not being modified. It could be
argued that once the claim has been divided pursuant to section 506(a),
only the unsecured portion of the mortgagee's claim is being modified,
and that the secured claim after the section 506 calculations is not being
modified. In conclusion, this modification would not be prohibited by
section 1322(b)(2) because it concerns only the unsecured portion of the
claim.'0 5
IV. PLAN CONFIRMATION AND POSSIBLE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED
WITH LIEN STRIPPING
Whenever a debtor's attorney attempts to strip home mortgage
liens, the attorney should be aware of potential problems that may arise
in obtaining a plan that will be confirmable by the court. Some of these
problems that will be discussed in the following section are: (1) whether
the plan's contents satisfy the requirements in section 1322, (2) whether
lien stripping creates a windfall to the debtor, and (3) whether the plan
can pass the best interest of creditors test.
103. Id. at 6-7.
104. In re Hayes, 22 Collier Bankr. Cases 2d (MD) 1009 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989).
105. One exception to this rule is the hardship provision found in 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b). See In re
Davidoff, 136 B.R. 567, 569 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that bifurcating a claim which valued
debtors' principal residence pursuant to section 506 into secured and unsecured claims was a modifi-
cation prohibited under section 1322(b)(2) due to the failure of the claimant to receive its note and
mortgage in full as bargained).
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A. Fulfilling the Plan's Requirements: Section 1322
In determining whether a plan that purports to modify a secured
creditor's originally filed claim, which is secured only by a home mort-
gage, complies with the requirements of Section 1322(a), the court must
make several determinations. The language contained in section
1322(b)(2) expressly states that the plan may modify the rights of holders
of secured claims "other than claims secured only by" a principal resi-
dence. The problem is the placement of the word "secured." In the
phrase "secured claims," it functions as an adjective modifying the word
claim. This entire phrase can be read to mean a "wholly secured
claim."' 06 In the phrase "claim secured only by," "secured" is an adverb
describing the character of the claim. This phrase does not necessarily
mean the original amount of the "secured claim" but could be read to
mean the "claim" (i.e., the amount of the claim after the required calcu-
lations are performed under section 506(a), which splits the home mort-
gage claim into a secured claim only for the judicially determined value
and an unsecured claim for the deficiency; the unsecured claim being the
only claim modified) that it is "secured by." ' 7
This play on the placement of the word "secured" can also be seen
in section 506(a). Section 506(a) provides in part, "an allowed claim of a
creditor secured by a lien on property .... is a secured claim to the extent
of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such
property." Thus, just because a creditor's claim is "secured by" property
doesn't mean that they have a "wholly secured claim."10 The secured
portion of a creditor's claim is determined by the value of the creditor's
interest in the property. The claim may or may not be a "secured claim,"
but it can still be a "claim secured by" a lien on property.
A debtor, pursuant to section 506(a), may divide a claim secured by
a security interest only in the debtors' principal residence into an allowed
secured claim and an allowed unsecured claim with the lien stripped on
the unsecured claim only upon completion of the debtor's plan. 109
106. In re Strober, 136 B.R. 614, 619 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1992).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 620.
109. See In re Hart, 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp.,
895 F.2d 123 (3rd Cir. 1990); In re Hougland, 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989). Under Chapter 13 a
debtor, exclusive of the trustee, has the rights and powers of a trustee under sections 363(b), (d), (e),
(f), and (I); thus, is permitted to invoke section 506(a). 11 U.S.C. § 1303. But see 11 U.S.C § 704,
where under a case in Chapter 7, only a trustee can invoke section 506(a) for the benefit of the estate.
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However, some courts disagree with this interpretation. The East-
ern District of New York in In re Strober held that any plan that con-
forms to section 1322(b)(5) 110 and affects any unsecured or secured claim
is subject to the limitations imposed by section 1322(b)(2), and
1322(b)(2) prohibits the modification of the mortgage debt. 1  Section
1322(b)(5) calls for regular payments while the case is pending on un-
secured claims equally with secured claims, provided the last payment on
the claim is due after the plan is completed. 12 Thus, the Strober court
ruled that such bifurcation could not be given the special protection of-
fered by section 1322(b)(5), which provides for curing of any default
within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments while the case is
pending, due to the failure of the debtor to cure the existing default.
However, in most cases allowing bifurcation, the debtor is merely curing
the default only to the extent that such default, together with any unpaid
principal balance, does not exceed the present value of the debtor's prin-
cipal residence ignoring any excess. 113
The Strober court also brought to life the issue of confirmation of
the plan under section 1325(a)(5). 114 A plan that fulfills the require-
ments set forth in section 1322(b)(5) will not be denied confirmation
under section 1325(a)(5) because "cure" under section 1322(b)(5) is not a
modification of the mortgagee's rights. 5 However, pursuant to section
1325(a)(5), one of three conditions must be met in regards to allowed
secured claims:
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan; (B)(i) the plan
provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien securing such
claim; and (ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property
110. This section provides for the curing of any default within a reasonable period of time and
continuance of payments while the case is pending on any unsecured claim or secured claim upon
which the last payment will be due after the date of the final payment as provided for under the plan.
111. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) provides in full: "notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection,
provide for the curing of any default within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments while
the case is pending on any unsecured claim or secured claim on which the last payment is due after
the date on which the final payment under the plan is due."
112. Id. § 1322(b).
113. In re Strober, 136 B.R. 614, 623 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1992).
114. Id. at 623. In determining whether a plan is confirmable, the court decides various issues:
(1) whether the plan complies with the provisions provided for in chapter 13 and other applicable
chapters; (2) whether the required fees and charges have been paid; (3) whether the plan was pro-
posed in good faith; (4) whether the best interest of creditor's test is satisfied; (5) whether allowed
secured claim holders which are provided for in the plan have either accepted the plan or if the
holder of such claim retains the lien and the value of the property to be distributed under the plan is
not less than the allowed amount of such claim or if the debtor has surrendered the property secur-
ing such claim to the holder; and (6) whether the debtor will be able to make all the payments under
the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a).
115. Strober, 136 B.R. 623 (citing Landmark Fin. Serv. v. Hall, 918 F.2d 1150, 1154 (4th Cir.
1990)); see also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, § 1322.0914] (15th ed. 1986).
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to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less
than the allowed amount of such claim; or (C) the debtor surrenders
the property securing such claim to such holder.1 16
The court stated that if the mortgagee's claim is allowed to be divided
into a secured claim and unsecured claim and then the mortgagee refuses
to accept the plan, the debtor must distribute under the plan to the mort-
gagee not less than the allowed amount of the secured portion of the
divided claim if he or she wants to retain their home. If this is true, it
could create difficulties for debtors due to the short life of plans under
Chapter 13. They would be forced to pay off the current value of the
their residence during the life of the plan which few debtors have the
capability to do. However, the court failed to recognize that "property
to be distributed under the plan" does not mean during the life of the
plan. When a debtor provides for a secured claim in a Chapter 13 plan,
the debtor provides for payment equal to the value of the claim with
maintenance of regular monthly payments at the same interest rate and
cures any arrearages during the life of the plan. Consequently, the plan
may be confirmed pursuant to section 1325(b)(5) because the value of the
claim is being provided for under the plan, and the secured claimant's
rights are not being modified.
B. Avoiding a Windfall
In confirming a plan the debtor should not receive an undue wind-
fall. Whenever a creditor's secured interest is frozen at a judicially deter-
mined value pursuant to section 506, the creditor will either (1) gain a
bonus if the property's value depreciates from the time its value is judi-
cially determined or (2) lose any benefit if the value of the property ap-
preciates from that same time. Any increase will enure to the benefit of
the debtor rather than the bankruptcy estate, while any decrease will en-
ure to the creditor. This decrease or increase is referred to as a "wind-
fall." I" Thus, in a Chapter 13, does a debtor get more than a fresh start
if this windfall is allowed to occur?
The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma in In
re Woodall118 believed a windfall occurs. 19 The Woodall court ruled
116. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)5).
117. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992) (holding that in a Chapter 7 the lien stays
with the real property until the foreclosure, because this is what the parties originally bargained for
and the voidness language in section 522(d) applies only to the security aspect of the lien and then
only to the "real deficiency in the security"); see In re Strober, 136 B.R. 614, 619 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y.
1992).
118. 123 B.R. 95 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1990).
119. Id. at 97.
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that the debtor should not be allowed to reap the benefit of their dis-
charged "unsecured" claim if the value of the property rises between the
time of the judicial determination and the foreclosure sale. 20 However,
in Dewsnup, the dissent explained that the feared "windfall" to the
debtor is prevented pursuant to section 551121 which preserves liens that
are voided under section 506(d) or through other provisions of the Code
for "the benefit of the estate" (i.e., for the benefit of the general un-
secured creditors). 22 Therefore, a "windfall" to the debtor is avoided.
C. Passing the Best Interest of Creditors Test
For a plan to be confirmed by a bankruptcy court it must meet the
best interest of creditors test.1 23 The goal of section 1325(a)(4) is to put
the creditor in the same position that he would have been in if the
debtor's estate had been liquidated under a Chapter 7; that is, does the
plan pass the best interest of creditors test. Thus, the court must make a
hypothetical determination as to the net amount that would be available
to unsecured creditors in a Chapter 7 liquidation.1 24 The bankruptcy
court must determine whether distribution of the funds were made in
accordance with section 726(a) (i.e.: payments to section 507 claimants,
payments to allowed timely filed, unsecured claims; payments to un-
secured claims filed late, etc.), the creditors would receive as much as
they would receive in a Chapter 7? If the answer is yes, the Chapter 13
plan is confirmable. It appears that if a claim secured by a home mort-
gage is allowed to be lien stripped in a Chapter 13, the creditor would
receive over time an amount equal to only the present market value of
120. Id.
121. 11 U.S.C. § 551 provides in part: "Any lien void under § 506(d) of this title, is preserved
for the benefit of the estate but only with respect to property of the estate." Id. This section pre-
vents junior lien holders from improving their position at the expense of the estate when a senior lien
is avoided.
122. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 781 n.1. See Tracy Springer, Note, An Individual Debtor's Right to
Avoid Liens Under Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 263, 280-281
(1990); see also In re Ward, 42 B.R. 946, 952-53 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984).
123. 11 U.S.C. section 1325(a)(4) provides:
(a)Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan if - (4) the
value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on
account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be paid on
such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such
date.
Id.; see Johnson v. Home State Bank, I11 S. Ct. 2150 (1991); Education Assistance Corp. v. Zellner,
827 F.2d. 1222, 1224 (8th Cir. 1987); In re Rogers, 65 B.R. 1018, 1020 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986).
124. In re Hieb, 88 B.R. 1019, 1021 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1988).
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the property which is less than he would receive in a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion case. Thus, the plan would be denied confirmation because it fails to
satisfy the best interest of creditors test.
However, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma viewed this problem differently. In In re Ward, the Chapter
13 plan was confirmed. The language in section 1322(a)(4), the "best
interest of creditors test," requires that the present value of amounts to
be distributed under a Chapter 13 plan must be no less than the amount
that the creditor would receive on such claim in a Chapter 7.125 Thus, in
a Chapter 7 case, the creditor holding a lien on the debtors's home would
either receive (1) the present market value of the property after it is liqui-
dated by or on behalf of the trustee, or (2) its property back and would
have an unsecured claim for any deficiency that may result after sale of
the property. The debtor, in most cases, would therefore receive no divi-
dend on its unsecured claim in this hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation.
But in the same scenario under Chapter 13, even though the creditor's
lien on the undersecured property may be stripped, its remaining un-
secured claim would participate in any payments to unsecured creditors
under the Chapter 13 plan, resulting in the creditor receiving more than
it would have under the hypothetical Chapter 7 case, satisfying the test.
VI. RAMIFICATIONS OF LIEN STRIPPING IN CHAPTER 13
In a Chapter 13 the ramifications once a lien has been stripped from
an undersecured claim can be far reaching and serious. While the ability
to strip the lien may have an advantageous effect for some parties, it can
have an equally detrimental effect on other interested parties. The fol-
lowing section will address the effects of lien stripping upon: (A) the
debtor; (B) the creditor and the home mortgage industry; and (C) the
attorney.
A. Affects On the Debtor
There is doubt that the effects of lien stripping in Chapter 13 upon a
debtor are very advantageous. The debtor is not only able to drag out
any arrearages through the Chapter 13 plan over three to five years but is
also able to reduce the length of his mortgage by several years. This
enables the debtor to keep his house by paying only the fair market value
125. In re Ward, No. BK-91-1868-LN at 14-16 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. July 12, 1991).
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and whatever dividend the mortgage holder will receive as an under-
secured creditor, allowing the debtor to retain the original amount bor-
rowed, which could be substantially greater than the amount he or she is
actually going to repay the creditor. Even though the debtor is not able
to modify the interest rate or the amount of the payments, he or she does
receive a benefit by reducing the length of time in making mortgage pay-
ments. Depending on the amount his or her house has decreased in
value, this could result in several years being cut off of his or her loan,
resulting in a reduced amount being paid in total principal and interest.
Thus, although there is some doubt that lien stripping is beneficial in a
Chapter 13, great advantages are still evident for the debtor.
B. Affects On the Creditors
On the other hand, the creditors who hold the mortgages of these
debtors suffer a substantial detriment. Creditors including the real estate
mortgage industry have long spoken against the debtor's ability to lien
strip. During the 95th Congressional hearing on both the Senate and the
House bills regarding lien stripping, testimony was given against lien
stripping.126 The testimony reflected that bankruptcy proceedings, such
as those involving lien stripping, have an adverse affect on the real estate
lending community. The effect is the dramatic decrease in funding for
new mortgages. Lien stripping causes the lenders to be extremely careful
and conservative in making loans to individuals whose financial re-
sources are questionably weak. 127
It is not difficult to see why creditors would be against lien stripping.
They initially enter into a bargain with the debtor on agreed terms to
lend a specific amount of money to be repaid over a specified period of
time at a certain rate of interest. Whenever a debtor files for bankruptcy
under chapter 13 and commences to lien strip pursuant to section 506(a),
the creditor has their lien stripped from the debtor's property to the ex-
tent of the excess of the fair market value over the amount of the debt.
The creditor, now holding an unsecured claim for the deficiency, stands
in line with the rest of the unsecured creditors for the remaining balance.
Even though these circumstance may seem harsh, in reality the
creditor is receiving more than he would have if the debtor had filed
under Chapter 7 by virtue of any dividends he may receive on his un-
secured claim. Outside of bankruptcy, if the debtor would have been
foreclosed, he would have received the same as he would have under
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chapter 7; the fair market value of the property. At least in Chapter 13,
the creditor will still retain its lien for the fair market value of the prop-
erty and will receive payments on its unsecured claim during the term of
the plan.
However, one possible disadvantage is that under a Chapter 7, if the
debtor does not reaffirm on the mortgage and instead relinquishes posses-
sion back to the creditor, the creditor has the choice of waiting until a
point in time to sell the property at which the market value may be
higher. This allows the creditor to wait and hopefully recover the full
debt if the real estate market returns to normal conditions and the value
of the property increases. Under a Chapter 13 strip down, the creditor is
not afforded this advantage and has its secured claim determined at the
time when the court determines its value. 128
C. Affects On Counsel
The most dramatic effect on counsel is the time involved in bringing
the motion or adversary proceeding to avoid the lien on the mortgage.
Usually, a debtor's attorney is paid a flat fee in a sum certain for filing the
Chapter 13 plan. A portion of this fee is paid directly to the attorney
before filing the plan with the remainder of the fees paid through the
plan. However, in the filing of an adversary proceeding or motion to
strip a lien on a home mortgage, the attorney's fees could be substantially
increased. This would require an amendment to the plan providing for
payment of these additional attorney fees. Because these attorney fees
128. Some jurisdictions have local rules which specify that a motion for a section 506 hearing
must be brought within 15 days from the date of the meeting of creditors. Agricredit Corp. v.
Harrison, (In re Harrison) No. 92-5068 at 1 (10th Cir. March 3, 1993). An attorney should always
consult the local rules in his or her jurisdiction in determining whether such a limitation exists.
Other possible problems, such as case dismissal or case conversion, plague the creditor by forc-
ing him to incur more legal fees due to the increased litigation and costs involved. Upon dismissal of
a Chapter 13 case, 11 U.S.C. section 349(b)(1)(C) provides that "[u]nless the court, for cause, orders
otherwise, a dismissal of a case other than under section 742 of this title (I) reinstates (C) any lien
voided under section 506(d) of this title." Id. This puts the debtor back in the same shoes as before
filing for bankruptcy regarding his mortgage and lien. The stay is removed upon dismissal and the
creditor can pursue foreclosure action against the debtor if he so chooses.
However, if the Chapter 13 case is converted to a Chapter 7 case under I 1 U.S.C. section 348,
the implications can be much more complicated. Unlike the dismissal provision, 11 U.S.C. section
348 provides no guidance as to the voided lien. Some very real concerns on practitioners minds' are
whether the mortgage goes back to its prior amount, or does the mortgage remain the same due to
the order which was granted in the Chapter 13 case, or does it make any difference if the debtor
converts at the end of one month, two months or four years?
The creditor should either (1) look to the language of the order itself because the judge may
have specifically dealt with conversion in the order or (2) the creditor should file a motion with the
court asking for the bifurcation order to be vacated due to the precedent established by the United
States Supreme Court in Dewsnup, which disallowed lien stripping in Chapter 7. This insures the
creditor the protection he is warranted in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case.
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are paid from the debtor's post-petition income through the plan, this
takes away money from the unsecured creditors. This could create diffi-
culties in formulating a plan that the court will confirm. The additional
hours that the attorney will expend along with the extra costs should be
considered before the debtor's attorney commences to lien strip.
Another factor to be considered is the additional amount of time
that could be involved. The debtor's attorney can expect that if a debtor
is successful in stripping a lien on his home mortgage, the order will be
appealed by the creditor. This involves not only more of the attorney's
time but more of the debtor's money. 29
VII. CONCLUSION
Lien stripping involves an undersecured claim that has been divided
into two parts: (1) a secured claim in the amount of the current value or
judicially determined value of the collateral and (2) an unsecured claim
for the difference between the determined value and the amount of the
debt. The lien is thus stripped from the unsecured claim and continues
to attach to the secured claim.
In Dewsnup the Supreme Court ruled that a Chapter 7 debtor could
not invoke section 506(a) to bifurcate a secured claim into a secured
claim for the fair market value and an unsecured claim on the deficiency
and then use section 506(d) to avoid the lien on the unsecured claim.
However, in a Chapter 13 the debtor may invoke section 506(a) to bifur-
cate the claim and strip the lien on the unsecured portion of the claim.
Due to the language contained in Section 1322(b)(2), this procedure be-
comes questionable when the claim is one that is secured by a home
mortgage. Some jurisdictions believe that because the claim is an "al-
lowed secured claim," revaluing the originally filed secured claim pursu-
ant to section 506(a) and stripping the lien from the unsecured portion is
a modification that is prohibited by section 1322(b)(2). These jurisdic-
tions contend that the claim which is secured by the home mortgage is
the original claim and not the value of the claim after invoking section
506(a). Thus, the lien continues to attach to the original amount of the
claim and not just the fair market value of the claim.
However, to give this broad new meaning to the Code would destroy
129. Attorneys in Oklahoma should note that Congress may turn the tables when Congressman
Mike Synar and the House of Representatives announce their own bankruptcy reform measure soon.
It contains a clause which bars Chapter 13 cramdowns which involve a debtor's principal residence.
This bill should be enacted some time this year when Congress reconvenes. James S. Byrne, Appeals
Court Hands Lenders Another Cramdown Defeat, AM. BANKER-BOND BUYER, May 25, 1992, at 1.
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any predictability of how it was designed to work. Even though a claim
is allowed, it can still be divided into two claims: one secured in the
amount of the judicially determined value of the collateral and one un-
secured for the deficiency. Since the debtor continues to make the same
mortgage payments and does not attempt to change the amount of the
payment or interest rate, the creditor who holds a claim secured by a
home mortgage is not having its rights modified. The unsecured claim is
the only claim being modified which is allowed in a Chapter 13 plan as
long as the debtor completes the plan. But, the plan may still not be
confirmable if the plan fails to meet the best interest of creditors test.
Thus, with the embers barely smoldering from the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Dewsnup, the cloud of smoke still remains as
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